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In the last decade, efforts have been made to reconcile theoretical security with realistic imperfect
implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD). Implementable countermeasures are proposed
to patch the discovered loopholes. However, certain countermeasures are not as robust as would be
expected. In this paper, we present a concrete example of ID Quantique’s random-detector-efficiency
countermeasure against detector blinding attacks. As a third-party tester, we have found that the
first industrial implementation of this countermeasure is effective against the original blinding attack,
but not immune to a modified blinding attack. Then, we implement and test a later full version of
this countermeasure containing a security proof [C. C. W. Lim et al., IEEE J. Sel. Top. Quantum
Electron. 21, 6601305 (2015)]. We find that it is still vulnerable against the modified blinding attack,
because an assumption about hardware characteristics on which the proof relies fails in practice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, applied cryptography systems rely on the
hardness of certain mathematical assumptions, which
only provides computational security [1, 2]. Once an
eavesdropper has enough computing power, such as a
quantum computer, the security of these classical encryp-
tion algorithms will be broken [3, 4]. However, quantum
key distribution (QKD) allows two parties, Alice and
Bob, to share a secret key based on the laws of quan-
tum mechanics [5–8]. Because of no-cloning theorem [9],
an eavesdropper with arbitrary computing power can-
not copy the information sent by Alice without leaving
any trace, which guarantees the unconditional security of
communication [10–15].
For this gradually maturing technology, practical QKD
systems have been realised in laboratories [16–19] and
several companies have provided commercial QKD sys-
tems to general customers [20]. However, imperfect com-
ponents used in the implementations lead to security is-
sues that have attracted an increasing attention in the
last decade [21–30]. Since increasing number of quan-
tum attacks have been demonstrated, academic commu-
nity is already aware of the security threat from practical
loopholes. Therefore, the next step is to come up with
loophole-free countermeasures. Importantly, the security
of these countermeasures should be verified.
In this paper, an example of testing the security of
an implemented countermeasure is given. We examine
ID Quantique’s attempted countermeasure to earlier dis-
covered bright-light detector control attacks [26, 31, 32]
that were demonstrated 6 years ago on ID Quantique’s
and MagiQ Technologies’ QKD products. The counter-
measure is to randomly remove some detector gates to
∗ angelhuang.hn@gmail.com
force the effective detection efficiency to zero during those
slots [33]. The idea is that when an eavesdropper is per-
forming the blinding attack, she will produce click during
these removed gates and thus get caught. This counter-
measure has been implemented in a commercial system
Clavis2 by two authors of this paper working at ID Quan-
tique (M.S. and M.L.), then provided as-is in a form of
firmware update to the remaining four authors from the
University of Waterloo who played the role of a third-
party testing team. The authors from ID Quantique did
not participate in the test, however results of the test pro-
duced by the testing team were discussed by all authors
and agreed upon.
The experimental results produced by the testing
team show that although this countermeasure is effec-
tive against the original detector blinding attack [26],
it is no longer effective if the eavesdropper modifies her
attack slightly. We note here that this countermeasure
implemented by ID Quantique is the simplest possible
version of the original countermeasure proposal [33], and
has already been criticised as unreliable in a later the-
oretical work [34]. Hence, the testing team has gone
further ahead and manually implemented a full version
of the countermeasure using two non-zero detection effi-
ciency levels [33, 34], and tested it. Our testing shows
that even the full countermeasure is vulnerable to the
modified blinding attack. Specifically, we experimentally
disprove an assumption that Bob’s detection probabil-
ity under blinding attack cannot be proportional to his
single-photon detection efficiency, on which the theoreti-
cal analysis in Ref. 34 relies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews a
hacking-and-patching timeline of ID Quantique’s Clavis2
QKD system and introduces the countermeasure. In Sec-
tion III, testing results of ID Quantique’s first counter-
measure implementation are reported and our modified
blinding attack is introduced. Section IV theoretically
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2analyses conditions of a successful attack and shows that
the modified blinding attack satisfies them. Moreover,
in Section V, based on certain assumptions about a fu-
ture implementation of the full countermeasure [34], we
demonstrate two possible methods to hack this full ver-
sion implementation. We discuss the practicality of our
attacks against installed commercial QKD lines in Sec-
tion VI and conclude in Section VII.
II. FROM LOOPHOLE DISCOVERY TO
COUNTERMEASURE IMPLEMENTATION
In 2009, the vulnerability of the commercial QKD sys-
tem Clavis2 [35] to detector blinding attacks was identi-
fied and a confidential report was submitted to ID Quan-
tique (the work was published shortly afterwards [26]).
After this, ID Quantique has been trying to figure out
an experimental countermeasure against these attacks.
The timeline of this security problem is shown in Fig. 1.
In 2010, ID Quantique proposed a countermeasure that
randomizes the efficiency of a gated avalanche photodi-
ode (APD) by randomly choosing one out of two differ-
ent gate voltages, and filed this idea for a patent [33].
In this way, an eavesdropper Eve does not know the ex-
act efficiency of Bob in every gated slot and thus cannot
maintain his detection statistics. At the sifting phase,
if the observed detection rates differ from the expected
values, Alice and Bob would be aware of Eve’s presence
and discard their raw keys.
In 2014, Lim et al. proposed a specific protocol to
realize this countermeasure [34], which analyses the se-
curity mathematically for blinding attacks that obey a
certain assumption on their behavior. In the proto-
col, Bob randomly applies two non-zero detection ef-
ficiencies η1 > η2 > 0, and measures detection rates
R1 and R2 conditioned on these efficiencies. The effect
of detector blinding attack is accounted via the factor
(η1R2 − η2R1) / (η1 − η2). Without the blinding attack,
the detection rate is proportional to the efficiency, mak-
ing this factor zero. The analysis makes a crucial as-
sumption that the detection rate under blinding attack
R1 = R2, i.e., it will be independent of Bob’s choice of
η1,2. Then, under attack the factor will be greater than
zero, and reduces the secure key rate. This solution in-
tends to introduce an information gap between Eve and
Bob, for Eve has no information about Bob’s random
efficiency choice.
Later in 2014, ID Quantique implemented the counter-
measure as a firmware patch. The hardware in Clavis2
is not capable of generating two nonzero efficiency levels
that switch randomly between adjacent detector gates.
As a result, implementation is in a simple form by sup-
pressing gates randomly with 2% probability. The sup-
pressed gates represent zero efficiency η2 = 0, while the
rest of the gates represent calibrated efficiency η1 = η.
Ideally, in the updated system, there should be no click
in the absence of the gate. In practice, transient electro-
2009-10-22 Original report about blinding attack sent to IDQ
2010-10-08 IDQ applies for a patent on the randomization
of detector efficiency as a countermeasure
2014-08-27
2014-11-18
2015-04-17
Lim et al. upload a preprint about full implementation
of countermeasure to arXiv:1408.6398
Simplified implementation of countermeasure delivered 
by IDQ to our lab (firmware update for Clavis2)
Testing report sent to IDQ proposing a modified attack 
that works
2004-11-10 First commercial Clavis1 system
is shipped to a customer
2015-12-21
Testing report sent to IDQ showing full implementation
of countermeasure to be unreliable
FIG. 1. Timeline of hacking-countermeasure-hacking for the
bright-light detector control class of attacks.
magnetic interference may extremely infrequently lead
to a click without a gate. Therefore, an alarm counter
is used with the system lifetime limit of 15 clicks in the
absence of the gate. If this limit is reached, it triggers the
firmware to brick the system and require factory mainte-
nance. This implementation assumes that under blinding
attack [26], click probability should not depend on the
gate voltage and the attack should therefore cause clicks
at the slots of gate absence.
III. TESTING THE COUNTERMEASURE
In this section, we demonstrate that the countermea-
sure presently implemented by ID Quantique is effective
against the original blinding attack [26], but not suffi-
cient against the general class of attacks attempting to
take control of Bob’s single-photon detectors.
Let us briefly remind the reader how Clavis2 and the
original blinding attack against it work. Clavis2 is a
bidirectional phase-encoding QKD system [35, 36]. Af-
ter Bob sends multi-photon bright pulses to Alice, Al-
ice randomly modulates one of the four BB84 phase
states [5], attenuates the pulses and sends them back to
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FIG. 2. Click probability under original blinding attack [26]
versus energy of trigger pulse. The blinding power is
1.08 mW, as the same as the power used in the published
original attack [26]. The timing of trigger pulse is 0.7 ns long,
3 ns after the centre of the gate signal, which should roughly
reproduce the original attack [26].
Bob. Bob randomly chooses one out of two measurement
bases. Interference happens between pulses from longer
and shorter paths of an interferometer at Bob’s side, and
the outcomes of interference depend on the phase differ-
ence between Alice’s and Bob’s modulation [37]. How-
ever, Eve is able to control the outcomes by the follow-
ing strategy. She shines bright light to blind the detec-
tors, and then intercepts Alice’s states [26]. According
to Eve’s interception results, she re-sends faked states by
multi-photon pulses to Bob’s blinded detectors. If Bob
chooses the same measurement basis as Eve’s, the pulses
interfere at Bob’s interferometer, so that all power of the
pulse goes to one detector to trigger a click. If the mea-
surement bases chosen by Bob and Eve are mismatched,
there is no interference, and the power of the pulse is split
equally between Bob’s two detectors. In this case, nei-
ther detector clicks. In this attack, Eve can fully control
Bob’s detectors and obtain the whole key tracelessly [26].
For the original blinding attack, Eve sends bright-light
continuous-wave (c.w.) laser light to blind Bob’s detec-
tors. Then a trigger pulse is sent slightly after the gate to
make a click. We repeat this attack for improved Clavis2
system and test the amount of energy to trigger a click
which is shown in Fig. 2. From Fig. 2, we can see the
trigger pulse energy for gate presence (solid curves) is
lower than that for gate absence (dashed curves), because
minute electrical fluctuations of APD voltage following
the gate signal lower the click threshold slightly.
However, if Eve tries to trigger a click with 100% prob-
ability when the gate is applied, this amount of trigger
pulse energy (marked by a dotted vertical line in Fig. 2)
0
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FIG. 3. Idealized APD gate signal and real oscillogram of
optical trigger pulse. Relative time between the gate voltage
transitions and the optical pulse is approximate. The c.w.
signal is generated by a 1536 nm laser diode; the trigger pulse
signal is obtained by modulating pump current of a separate
1551 nm laser diode, using an electrical pulse generator [26].
also might trigger a click with non-zero probability when
the gate is suppressed, which is monitored and results in
an alarm. Therefore, Eve cannot hack the system with
full controllability. To avoid clicks in slots of gate sup-
pression, Eve could in theory decrease the level of trigger
pulse energy to trigger a click sometimes with gate pres-
ence, but never with gate absence. This also satisfies a
necessary condition of a successful attack which we will
discuss in Section IV later. Unfortunately, in practice,
our testing result shows the amount of trigger pulse en-
ergy required to trigger D0 without the gate is about
710 fJ, which is only 1.5% less than the amount of en-
ergy for 100% click (720 fJ) when the gate is present. The
1.5% difference of these two energy levels is likely not big
enough to achieve a reliable attack operation that avoids
triggering the countermeasure. Also, D1 will always trig-
ger at these energy levels, revealing the attack. Eve could
target D1 using a slightly lower energy level, but the rel-
ative precision required is similar there. Routine fluctu-
ations of temperature and other equipment parameters
may lead to some instability of these trigger pulse energy
levels, causing a risk for Eve to trigger a few clicks in the
gate absence and brick the system being attacked. From
this point of view, we think this first implementation of
countermeasure is effective against the original blinding
attack.
We can slightly modify our blinding attack to break the
security of this countermeasure. Similarly to the original
blinding attack, Bob’s detectors are blinded by a bright-
light laser first. Then, instead of sending a trigger pulse
slightly after the gate as in the original attacks [26], we
send a 0.7 ns long trigger pulse on top of the c.w. illu-
mination during the detector gate, as shown in Fig. 3.
This trigger pulse produces a click in one of Bob’s two
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FIG. 4. Oscillograms at comparator input in the detector circuit, proportional to APD current. (a) Geiger mode. The small
positive and negative pulses are due to gate signal leakage through the APD capacitance of ∼ 1 pF. (b) Geiger mode, single-
photon avalanche. (c–f) The detector is blinded with 0.56 mW c.w. illumination, with (c) no trigger pulse applied, (d) 0.32 pJ
trigger pulse applied 5 ns after the gate, (e) 0.32 pJ trigger pulse applied in the gate, and (f) 0.16 pJ trigger pulse applied in
the gate.
detectors only if Bob applies the gate and his basis choice
matches that of Eve; otherwise there is no click.
To explain why this modified attack succeeds, let us
remind the reader the normal operation of an avalanche
photodiode (APD). The detectors in Clavis2 are gated
APDs. When the gate signal is applied, the voltage
across the APD VAPD is greater than its breakdown volt-
age Vbr. If a single photon comes during the gated time,
an avalanche happens and causes a large current. This
current is converted into a voltage by the detector elec-
tronic circuit. If the peak voltage is larger than a thresh-
old Vth = 70 mV, the detector registers a photon detec-
tion (a ‘click’). Fig. 4(a) and (b) show the cases of no
photon coming and a photon introducing an avalanche.
Appendix A explains more details of the detector opera-
tion principle and the blinding attack.
A bright laser is able to blind the APDs. Under c.w.
illumination, the APD produces constant photocurrent
that overloads the high-voltage supply and lowers VAPD.
Then, even when the gate signal is applied, VAPD does
not exceed Vbr and the APD remains in the linear mode
as a classical photodetector that is no longer sensitive
to single photons. This means the detectors become
blinded.
Under the blinding attack, Fig. 4(c–e) shows the de-
tector voltages in different cases: when no trigger pulse
is applied and when the trigger pulse is applied either
after or in the gate. Since in the linear mode the gain
factor of secondary electron-hole pairs generation in the
APD depends on the voltage across it, the 3 V gate ap-
plied to the APD increases the gain factor. This larger
gain during the gated time assists the APD in generating
a larger photocurrent than the photocurrent outside the
gate. Therefore the gate signal causes a positive pulse as
shown in Fig. 4(c). The trigger pulse applied after the
gate produces a second pulse, but the peak voltages of
neither pulses exceed Vth [Fig. 4(d)]. However, when the
trigger pulse is shifted inside the gate, the two pulse am-
plitudes add up, reach Vth and produce a detector click
[Fig. 4(e)]. If Bob chooses a different measurement basis
than Eve, only half of the trigger pulse energy arrives at
each detector [26]. In this case, the peak voltage does
not reach Vth [Fig. 4(f)]. Overall, only when the trigger
pulse is applied during the gate time and Bob chooses
the same basis as Eve, the detector under the blinding
attack clicks. As a result, Eve can control Bob’s detec-
tors to make Bob obtain the same measurement result as
her, and does not introduce extra errors [26].
Contrary to most of previously demonstrated attacks
attempting to take control of single-photon detectors [26,
28, 31], in the present demonstration the timing of the
trigger pulse has to be aligned with the gate. Besides tim-
ing alignment, another important factor of the attack is
the trigger pulse energy E. To test the effect of different
trigger pulse energy, we gradually increase it and observe
the detection outcomes. Figure 5 shows schematically in
which order clicks appear in Clavis2 as E is increased.
We observe three thresholds.
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FIG. 5. Output of a blinded detector in Clavis2 under control
of trigger pulses of different energy. The top graph shows a
gate applied at the first slot, but suppressed at the second
slot. However, an optical trigger pulse is sent to the detec-
tor in both slots. Graphs A–E show detector output versus
trigger pulse energy E. In graph A, the energy is insufficient
to produce a click. As the energy is increased above Egatenever,i,
clicks intermittently appear in the presence of the gate, as
shown in graph B. At the energy level above Egatealways,i, the
gate always has a click, as shown in graph C. However, there
is never a click when there is no gate. At a higher energy
level above Eno gatenever,i , clicks in the gate absence appear inter-
mittently (graph D) or always (graph E).
• If E ≤ Egatenever,i (where i ∈ {0, 1} is detector num-
ber), the detector never clicks when the gate is ap-
plied.
• If E ≥ Egatealways,i, the detector always clicks when
the gate is applied.
• If E ≤ Eno gatenever,i , the detector never clicks when the
gate is suppressed.
Figure 6 shows these detection thresholds measured for
a range of c.w. blinding powers. All the thresholds rise
with the blinding power, because higher blinding power
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FIG. 6. Energy thresholds of trigger pulse versus c.w. blinding
power. Shaded area shows the range of trigger pulse energies
of the perfect attack.
leads to a larger photocurrent and lower VAPD. The de-
creased VAPD leads to smaller gain and thus lower sen-
sitivity to the trigger pulse. (Appendix B contains a
more detailed investigation of the processes inside the
detector.) As can be seen, for any given blinding power,
Eno gatenever,i is much higher than the other click thresholds.
This easily allows the original detector control attack [26]
to proceed undetected by the countermeasure. A more
formal analysis will be stated in the next section.
IV. CONDITIONS OF A SUCCESSFUL ATTACK
Experimental result of the previous section shows that
the attack of Ref. 26 is possible in Clavis2. However,
general conditions for a successful attack should be anal-
ysed theoretically. In this section, we first consider strong
conditions for a perfect attack, in which Eve induces a
click in Bob with 100% probability if their bases match
and the gate is applied, and 0% probability otherwise.
These conditions are definitely sufficient for a successful
attack [26]. However, as we remark later in this section,
even if these strong conditions are not satisfied, an attack
may still be possible.
Strong conditions. If the detection outcome varies
as Fig. 5 with the increase of trigger pulse energy, the
order of the three thresholds is:
Eno gatenever,i > E
gate
always,i > E
gate
never,i. (1)
If Eve and Bob select opposite bases, half of the en-
ergy of trigger pulse goes to each Bob’s detector. In this
case, none of the detectors should click despite the gate
presence. This is achieved if [26]
1
2
max
i
{
Egatealways,i
}
<
(
min
i
{
Egatenever,i
})
. (2)
6The random gate suppression imposes additional condi-
tions. In case of basis mismatch, half of the trigger pulse
energy is arriving at each detector. It should induce a
click in neither detector when the gate signal is absent.
For the target detector i, there is no click once Eq. (1) is
satisfied. For the other detector i⊕1, no click is achieved
when half of the trigger pulse energy is still lower than
the detection threshold in the no-gate case. That is,
1
2
Egatealways,i < E
no gate
never,i⊕1. (3)
If the bases match, we need to make sure there is no click
when the gate is suppressed, but always a click in the ex-
pected detector in the gate presence. This is achieved if
Egatealways,i < E
no gate
never,i , which is already included in inequal-
ity (1). Although inequality (3) has a physical meaning,
it mathematically follows from inequalities (1) and (2).
Thus satisfying inequalities (1) and (2) represents the
strong attack conditions and guarantees the same perfor-
mance as in Ref. 26. The shaded area in Fig. 6 indicates
a range of the trigger pulse energies Eve can apply for
the perfect attack. The range is sufficiently wide to al-
low for a robust implementation, only requiring Eve to
set correct energy with about ±15% precision.
Necessary condition. An attack may still be pos-
sible even if Eve’s trigger pulse does not always cause a
click in Bob when their bases match, and/or sometimes
causes a click when their bases do not match [38]. The
latter introduces some additional QBER but as long as
it’s below the protocol abort threshold, Alice and Bob
may still produce key. The random gate removal coun-
termeasure imposes the condition
Eno gatenever,i > E
gate
never,i, (4)
which means Eve should be able to at least sometimes
cause a click in the gate while never causing a click with-
out the gate (lest the alarm counter is increased). This is
a necessary condition for an attack. As the present paper
details, there are strong engineering reasons why this con-
dition is likely to be satisfied in a detector. Additional
conditions will depend on exact system characteristics
[38].
V. WILL A FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
COUNTERMEASURE BE ROBUST?
We have proved so far that the current countermeasure
with gate suppression cannot defeat the detector blind-
ing attack. However, the paper of Lim et al. [34] claims
that the full version of countermeasure with two non-zero
detection efficiencies is effective against a large class of
detector side-channel attacks including the blinding at-
tack [26]. Even though this full countermeasure has not
been implemented by ID Quantique, we have tested some
properties of the detectors in Clavis2 to show two pos-
sible methods to hack the full countermeasure, based on
certain assumptions about a future implementation.
120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 210 2200
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Trigger pulse energy (fJ)
Cl
ick
 p
ro
ba
bil
ity
Vbias, 0 = 54.86 V
Vbias, 0 = 55.26 V
Vbias, 1 = 54.30 V
Vbias, 1 = 54.70 V
E1E2E3E4
FIG. 7. Click probabilities under blinding attack versus en-
ergy of trigger pulse. Solid curves show the energy of trigger
pulse for original Vbias, while dashed curves for reduced Vbias
lowering photon detection efficiency by about a factor of 2.
The blinding power is 0.38 mW and the timing of trigger
pulse is aligned in the middle of the gate by minimizing its
energy required to make a click.
Bob could choose randomly between P/2 and P detec-
tion efficiency by changing either gate voltage amplitude
Vgate or high-voltage supply Vbias [34]. Since in Clavis2
hardware Vgate is fixed (see Appendix A), we assume an
engineer will change Vbias to achieve different non-zero
detection efficiencies. To achieve half of original detec-
tion efficiency, we lower Vbias manually. When Vbias,0 of
D0 drops from −55.26 V to −54.86 V, the detection ef-
ficiency P0 reduces from 22.6% to 12.8%. Similarly, we
decrease Vbias,1 of D1 from −54.70 V to −54.40 V, lead-
ing to the detection efficiency P1 reduction from 18.9%
to 9.7%. After that, we test Eve’s controllability of these
two detectors.
First, we blind the detectors and then measure the re-
lation between the energy of trigger pulse and probability
to cause a click. The position of trigger pulse is fixed in
the middle of gate signal. Figure 7 shows the testing re-
sult which indicates there is a transition range between
0% and 100% click probability.
From the measurement result, Eve can randomly se-
lect different levels of trigger pulse energy (shown as dot-
ted lines in Fig. 7) to attack the full version of coun-
termeasure. As we know, only when Bob chooses the
same measurement basis as Eve, all the energy of trigger
pulse arrives targeted detector and achieves a click. For
target D0, if trigger pulse energy E1 is chosen, D0 al-
ways clicks, while at E2, the detector only clicks if higher
Vbias is applied. When E1 and E2 are chosen randomly
with the same probability P0/2, the detection probabil-
ity for higher Vbias is P0 and the detection probability
for lower Vbias is only P0/2. Therefore, the attack re-
produces correct detection probabilities as the protocol
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FIG. 8. Click probabilities under blinding attack versus rela-
tive time shift of trigger pulse. Solid curves give the detection
probability at the original Vbias, and dashed curves give the
detection probability at lower Vbias. Note that the latter ex-
tends over a relatively narrower time window. The blinding
power is 0.38 mW. The energy of trigger pulse for D0 is
0.22 pJ and for D1 is 0.19 pJ. These energy levels are marked
as red × in Fig. 6.
requires. Similarly, for target D1, Eve can choose E3 to
trigger click always and choose E4 to get a click only if
higher Vbias is applies. This reproduces correct detec-
tion probabilities, P1/2 and P1. At the same time, E1
and E3 remain safely below E
no gate
never,0,1 shown in Fig. 6,
so clicks are never produced in the absence of the gate
and alarm is not triggered. This allows Eve to hack the
countermeasure tracelessly.
Second, we test the correlation between time shift of
trigger pulse and click probability of blinded detector.
The trigger pulse energy we use in this test for D1 is
slightly lower than that of D0, but both levels of energy
are above Egatealways,0,1 in Fig. 6 marked as red ×. The
measurement result is shown in Fig. 8.
This testing result illustrates another method to attack
the countermeasure: randomly adjusting the time shift of
the trigger pulse. For D0, after fixing the suitable energy
level of trigger pulse, Eve can always trigger a click by
choosing time shift T1, but only trigger a click at higher
Vbias by choosing T2. Similarly, if target detector is D1,
the detector always clicks at T3, but only clicks at higher
Vbias at T4. Then, when Eve sends trigger pulse to control
D0, she randomly selects T1 and T2 with equal probability
P0/2 to reproduce the correct detection efficiencies of D0.
Eve utilizes the same strategy for D1 to achieve correct
detection probabilities, P1/2 and P1. In this way, Eve
also hacks Clavis2 system tracelessly.
Generally, a finite set of decoy detection efficiency lev-
els η1 < η2 < η3 < ... < ηn can be hacked by properly
setting probabilities of different attacking energy levels
or time-shifts. We take energy levels of trigger pulse as
an example. According to the result in Fig. 7, it is rea-
sonable to extrapolate that we can find n distinct levels
of trigger pulse energy E1 > E2 > E3 > ... > En in this
situation. Then Eve can apply Ek (k = 1, ..., n) with
probability qk to satisfy ηk =
∑k
i=1 qi. This would re-
produce every expected value of ηk and hack the system.
We have so far assumed that applying energy level Ek
causes zero click probability for decoy levels up to ηk−1,
and 100% click probability for ηk and above. However
this is not a necessary condition. More generally, under
energy Ek, the click probability for efficiency level ηi is
βEkηi . To reproduce the expected efficiencies, we need to
satisfy the following set of equations:
q1β
E1
η1 + q2β
E2
η1 + ...+ qnβ
En
η1 = η1
q1β
E1
η2 + q2β
E2
η2 + ...+ qnβ
En
η2 = η2
......
q1β
E1
ηn + q2β
E2
ηn + ...+ qnβ
En
ηn = ηn. (5)
We might solve these equations to get values 0 ≤ qk < 1.
A worse case would be if Eve cannot find values of all
qk, which means she may only have a partial control of
Bob’s ηk. However, it still breaks the assumption in the
security proof [34] that Eve cannot form faked states with
click probability conditional on Bob’s randomly chosen
efficiency. For quantitative analysis, an updated security
proof would be needed first.
From the above testing and analysis of the implementa-
tion that changes Vbias, we can guess that an alternative
implementation that changes Vgate [34] or adds an inten-
sity modulator in front of the detectors [39], may leave
a similar loophole. If we apply the intensity modulator,
the energy of the trigger pulse arriving at the detector is
not constant but depends on the modulation. However,
this case is similar to gate voltage modulation, as we only
consider the total energy from the gate signal and trig-
ger pulse. Therefore, we will get similar results as Figs. 7
and 8, but the amount of trigger pulse energy and time
shift might be different.
The reason for this practical loophole is a wrong as-
sumption made by Lim and his colleagues [34]. They
assume Eve cannot generate faked states that trigger de-
tections with probabilities that are proportional to the
original photon detection efficiency. Here we have proved
this is in fact possible. Therefore, the model of a practi-
cal detector should be more precise in security analysis, if
one wishes to close the detector control loophole without
resorting to measurement-device-independent QKD.
VI. OUR ATTACKS IN A BLACK-BOX
SETTING
According to Kerckhoffs’ principle [40], Eve always
knows everything about the algorithms and hardware of
Alice’s and Bob’s boxes, including the precise values of
equipment parameters. The classical security community
8practices Kerckhoffs’ principle since 1970’s, and widely
agrees that this is a good approach to implementation
security [1]. This is supported by many examples of cryp-
tographic systems that did not follow this principle and
were compromised [41]. The quantum academic commu-
nity certainly agrees that QKD should be made secure in
this setting, which is necessary for QKD being uncondi-
tionally secure [10–15].
However, it is also a practically interesting question if
any proposed attack can be mounted on today’s commer-
cial QKD systems in a black-box setting, when Eve only
has access to the public communication lines but cannot
directly measure signals and values of analog parameters
inside Alice’s and Bob’s boxes [42]. In this realistic sce-
nario, Eve may purchase (or acquire by other means) a
sample of the system hardware, open it, make internal
measurements and rehearse her attacks on it. Then she
has to eavesdrop on her actual target, an installed system
sample in which she has not had physical access to the
boxes. Although the latter sample can be of the same
model and design, it will generally have different values
of internal analog parameters, owing to sample-to-sample
variation in system components. A full implementation
of our attacks in this scenario remains to be tested. In
this setting it will be of utmost importance for Eve to
avoid triggering clicks in the absence of the gate, because
this would very quickly brick the system and risk reveal-
ing her attack attempt. The original blinding attack that
applies the trigger after the gate becomes very sensitive
to precise values of thresholds in the presence of the first
version of countermeasure (Fig. 2). For this reason we
think the countermeasure will likely be triggered by the
original attack in the realistic black-box setting.
Our modified attack that applies the trigger inside the
gate will likely avoid triggering the alarm, because the
no-gate threshold energies are much higher that the en-
ergies required for detector control (Fig. 6). It also toler-
ates some fluctuation in experimental parameters for de-
tector control. For example, when Eve applies 0.38 mW
blinding power, 252 fJ trigger pulse energy, and times
her trigger pulse at the middle of the gate, we have veri-
fied that the attack still works perfectly for up to ±21%
change in the trigger energy (see Fig. 6) or up to ±1.3 ns
change in the trigger timing. This makes it robust against
reasonably expected fluctuations and imprecision of the
system parameters. In particular, the timing accuracy
required for our attack in much coarser than the several
tens of picoseconds precision Alice and Bob use in nor-
mal operation [43]. The trigger energy setting precision
is similar to the original attack that required ±16% [26].
Eve may need a few attempts to set a correct trigger
energy when attacking a new copy of the system. She can
do this by starting at a low trigger energy and attempt-
ing several increasing values of energy while watching the
classical traffic Alice-Bob for the success or failure of the
QKD session she has attacked [44]. A QKD session that
fails because of too low detection efficiency is a naturally
occurring event that is part of normal system operation,
does not raise an alarm and is recovered from automati-
cally in Clavis2 [43, 45].
A full two-level implementation of the countermeasure
may require Eve to run more attempts, because of a finer
degree of control required over the trigger pulse energy
and timing. Yet, similarly to the first countermeasure im-
plementation, the no-gate trigger energy that would raise
alarm remains safely well above the energies required for
detector control. The practicality of attack in the black-
box setting is thus difficult to predict without having the
actual industrial implementation of the full countermea-
sure, and actually demonstrating the full attack, which
can be a future study.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have tested the first implementation of the coun-
termeasure against the blinding attack in the commer-
cial QKD system Clavis2. Our testing result demon-
strates that presently implemented countermeasure is ef-
fective against the original blinding attack but not effec-
tive against a modified blinding attack. The modified
attack fully controls Bob’s single-photon detectors but
does not trigger the security alarm. The modified at-
tack is similar to the original detector blinding attack [26]
with the only difference that the trigger pulses are time-
aligned to coincide with the detector gates, instead of
following it. We argue that this attack should be imple-
mentable in practice against an installed QKD commu-
nication line where Eve does not have physical access to
characterising Alice and Bob, however such full demon-
stration has not yet been done, to our knowledge.
We have also tested the full proposed implementation
of countermeasure with two non-zero efficiency levels,
and found its security to be unreliable despite predictions
of the theory proposal [34]. From the current testing re-
sults, bright-pulse triggering probabilities of the blinded
detectors depend on several factors including Vbias, tim-
ing and energy of the trigger pulse (see Section V). This
in principle allows Eve to compromise the full counter-
measure implementation.
We have tested the countermeasure implemented with
the gated single-photon detectors (SPDs). The idea of
random detection efficiency can be applied to other types
of SPDs that are also sensitive to the blinding attack:
free-running SPDs [46] and superconducting nanowire
SPDs [28]. However, the countermeasure based on these
detectors might still be hackable. Since the efficiencies
of these types of SPDs depend on the bias voltage or
current, varying these bias signals likely changes other
parameters inside the SPD and its electronics. There-
fore, when we randomize the detection efficiency, other
degrees of freedom might be changed as well. Eve has a
chance to exploit these side channels to hack the counter-
measure. Of course, the exact outcome cannot be known
until the countermeasures in different types of detectors
are experimentally tested.
9According to our testing result, this countermeasure is
not as reliable as would be expected in a high-security
environment of QKD. Although an ideal industrial coun-
termeasure has not been achieved, everybody now has a
more clear concept about the detector loopholes. This
procedure emphasizes the necessity of security testing
every time practical QKD systems are developed or up-
dated. We only can reach the final practical security of
any QKD system after several iterations of implementa-
tion development and testing verification. Our counter-
measure testing also illustrates that patching a loophole
is still time-consuming and difficult. However, addressing
practical vulnerabilities at the design stage of a QKD sys-
tem is both cheaper and less messy than trying to retrofit
patches on an existing deployed solution. Addressing se-
curity at the design stage should be the goal whenever
possible.
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Appendix A: Background
In this section, we recap the operating principle of the
single-photon detector, its implementation in Clavis2,
and the original blinding attack [26]. Most available
single-photon detectors are APDs operating in Geiger
mode, in which they are sensitive to single photons [47].
As shown in Fig. 9, when the APD is reverse-biased above
its breakdown voltage Vbr, a single photon can cause a
large current IAPD. If this current exceeds the thresh-
old Ith, electronics registers this as a photon detection
(a ‘click’). After that, an external circuit quenches the
avalanche by lowering the bias voltage VAPD below Vbr,
and the APD comes into a linear mode. If the APD is
illuminated by bright light (which does not happen in
normal single-photon operation but can happen during
an eavesdropping attack), IAPD in the linear mode is pro-
portional to the incident bright optical power Popt. Ith
then becomes a threshold on the incident optical power
Pth that makes a click.
From an engineering view, the detector can be an-
alyzed by its circuit. Figure 10 shows an equivalent
circuit diagram of the two detectors used in Clavis2.
When no gate signal is applied, the APDs are biased
slightly below their Vbr by the negative high-voltage sup-
ply Vbias,0 = −55.26 V, Vbias,1 = −54.70 V [48]. To bring
the APD into Geiger mode, an additional 3 V high, 2.8 ns
long pulse is applied through a logic level converter DD1.
The anode of the APD is AC-coupled to a fast compara-
tor DA1. Since the capacitor C1 blocks the DC compo-
nent, only when the current flowing through the APD
changes, it generates a pulse as the input of DA1. If
the peak voltage of this pulse is greater than the positive
threshold Vth = 70 mV, the comparator produces a logic
output signal indicating a click. Once a click in either of
the two Bob’s detectors is registered, the next 50 gates
will not be applied to both detectors, which constitutes
a deadtime to reduce afterpulsing.
If Eve sends a bright c.w. illumination to the gated de-
tectors, the bright light makes the APD generate a sig-
nificant photocurrent that monotonically increases with
the optical power Popt. When we consider effects of this
current on the whole detector circuit (Fig. 10), the most
useful one is a reduction of the voltage across the APD
VAPD. Although the high-voltage supply Vbias stays con-
stant, the photocurrent causes a significant voltage across
R3 = 1 kΩ, thus VAPD drops. If we apply enough illu-
mination power, VAPD will be less than Vbr even inside
the gate, and the APD then always stays in the linear
mode. The detector becomes blind to single photons.
In our testing, we measure the voltage at test point T2
VT2 in Fig. 10 and refer to this voltage as VAPD in the
text. VT2 is close to real VAPD, because R1 + R2  R3
[precisely, VAPD = VT2 + (VT2 − Vbias)(R1 + R2)/R3].
After blinding Bob’s detectors, Eve can conduct a
faked-state attack. Eve first intercepts all photons sent
by Alice. Whenever Eve detects a photon, she sends the
same state to Bob via a bright trigger pulse of a certain
energy, superimposed on her blinding illumination. Only
if Bob chooses the same measurement basis as Eve and
applies the gate, one of Bob’s detectors will click and he
will get the same bit value as Eve. Otherwise, there is no
click at Bob’s side. During the sifting procedure, Alice
and Bob keep the bit values when they have chosen the
same basis, and so does Eve. Therefore Eve has identi-
cal bit values with Bob, introduces no extra QBER, and
does not increase the alarm counter. Eve then listens to
the public communication between Alice and Bob and
performs the same error correction and privacy amplifi-
cation procedures as them, to obtain an identical copy of
their secret key [26].
I APD Linear mode Geiger mode
Vbr
Single photon
I APD
I th
Pth Popt Qu
ench
ing
VAPD
I th
Vbias Vbias Vgate+
FIG. 9. Linear-mode and Geiger-mode APD operation
(reprinted from [26]).
10
DA1
MAX9601SY100H842
DD1
gate click
(PECL)
Output
(PECL)
Input
APD 1.1n
100n
R1
72
C1
C2150 150
R2 R4
=
T3 T4
T2
T1
1k
R3
Vth,0/1
Vbias,0/1
FIG. 10. Equivalent detector bias and comparator circuit, as
implemented in Clavis2 (reprinted from [26]).
Appendix B: Analysis of processes in the detector
For further understanding of the detector behaviour
under successful blinding attack, we attempt to quanti-
tatively model electrical and thermal processes in it. As
we mentioned previously, the bias voltage decreases when
the blinding power is applied. A measured relationship
between VAPD and continuous blinding power is shown
in Fig. 11. Detector 0 is blinded at Popt > Pblind,0 =
73.4 µW and detector 1 is blinded at Popt > Pblind,1 =
64.3 µW. Higher blinding illumination leads to lower bias
voltage. This is consistent with the same measurement
done for the original blinding attack [26].
In a detector blinded by c.w. laser illumination, the
gain factor is affected by not only the power of blind-
ing laser, but also the gate signal. When the APD is
blinded and forced to work in the linear mode, it can be
treated as an ordinary photodiode with a finite internal
gain. Photoelectrons and holes are accelerated by a high
electric field and initiate a chain of impact ionizations
that generates secondary electron-hole pairs. Thus, the
APD has an internal multiplication gain factor M > 1,
since one photon can yield many electrons of photocur-
rent flowing in the circuit. When VAPD is much lower
than Vbr, M will be close to 1. However, the APD may
not have any significant photosensitivity below so-called
punch-through voltage, below which the electrical field
does not extend into the absorption layer of InGaAs/InP
heterostructure [49].
We have done a measurement of small-signal gain G
of the APDs in Clavis2 by measuring their photocurrent
response to a short optical pulse input. The results are
shown in Fig. 12. There is virtually no photosensitivity
below the punch-through voltage of about 31 V. Above
that voltage G starts at ∼ 0.7 A/W (corresponding to
∼ 60% quantum efficiency assuming M = 1), then rises
above 100 A/W closer to Vbr. The gain values measured
at Vbr − 2 V are ∼ 7 and ∼ 10 A/W, which is consistent
with values from data sheets of commercial APDs. From
the above measurements, we know that Eve can vary the
amount of blinding power to the detectors to control the
bias voltage and thus the gain factor.
After we blind Bob’s detectors in Clavis2, the gain fac-
tor is greater during the 2.8 ns gate duration, because the
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FIG. 11. Bias voltage of APDs versus c.w. blinding power.
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FIG. 12. Gain versus APD bias voltage. Values of gain for
bias voltages below 31 V were negligibly low for a practical
attack, and below the sensitivity of our measurement method.
gate signal raises VAPD. Thus the electrical charge gen-
erated by the APD in response to a trigger pulse applied
in the gate is greater than when it’s applied outside the
gate. For example, in Fig. 4(c), the gate pulse alone con-
tributes 1.053 pC extra charge on top of the current that
would be generated without the gate. When the trigger
pulse is applied after the gate [Fig. 4(d)], the total charge
of the two pulses is 1.467 pC; however, when the trigger
pulse is moved into the gate [Fig. 4(e)], the total charge
rises to 1.613 pC. Therefore, a greater gain factor during
the gated time helps the pulse to cross the threshold.
We have attempted to model the increased gain due
to the gate. In our model, we consider a thermal ef-
fect and an internal resistance of the APD. On the one
hand, an increased temperature raises Vbr [50]. Elec-
trical heating (VAPD · IAPD) and the absorption of the
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blinding power result in a heat dissipation: 61.2 mW for
detector 0 and 66.03 mW for detector 1 [51]. Then, an
estimated 190 K/W thermal resistance [31] between each
APD chip and the cold plate converts the power dissipa-
tion into the increased temperature. The temperature-
dependent breakdown voltage increases with the coeffi-
cient of about 0.1 V/K [31]. As a result, Vbr increases
by 1.16 V (1.25 V) for detector 0 (1). Figure 12 shows
the relation between gain factor and the actual VAPD in
the linear mode. When VAPD is close to Vbr, the gain
factor increases rapidly. On the other hand, we suppose
the APD has a passive internal resistance, so the inter-
nal bias voltage across the ideal photodiode is less than
the value of VAPD we test. By measuring the voltage
of a stable avalanche pulse and calculating the current
trough the detector circuit when avalanche happens, we
obtain the internal resistance of 330 Ω in detector 0 and
275 Ω in detector 1. Therefore, the real bias voltage
under blinding attack shown in Fig. 4(c–f) is 53.77 V,
which corresponds to G = 3 A/W in detector 0 as shown
in Fig. 12. When 3 V gate is applied, the bias voltage
becomes 56.77 V which corresponds to G = 13 A/W
in Fig. 12. However, the measured charges in Fig. 4(d)
and (e) illustrate much less gain change: G = 1.3 A/W
at 53.77 V and G = 1.76 A/W at 56.77 V [52]. The
discrepancy may be explained by a larger actual thermal
resistance between the APD and the cold plate than we
estimate, which should be verified in future research.
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